KOEBEL vs. SAUNDERS.

"cIf goods be put on board in a damaged condition and are in
consequence liable to effervesce and generate the fire by which
they are consumed, the uinderwriters are not liable." In our law
seaworthiness is made to depend upon a 1#arranty, so that, if a
vessel is unseaworthy, as, for example, from not having a sufficient crew on board, and she is lost by reason of some cause not
connected with that unseaworthiness, it will be sufficient for the
underwriter, in repudiating his liability, to prove that she was
unseaworthy. Unless you are to invent a new implied warranty
with respect to goods, and say that, where goods are insured and
the premium paid, and the goods destroyed by the perils insured
against, the insurers are not liable by reason of some unseaworthiness in the goods, this plea is bad. I never can consent
to introduce a novelty likely so seriously to affect the mercantile
faw of the country.
BYLES, J.-I
concur in saying that where goods perish by
their own vice they are not destroyed by perils of the sea insured
against. The proper mode of taking advantage of such a ground
of defence is, by pleading in the ordinary way, that the goods
were not lost by the perils insured against. It was said by Mr.
Tratkin Williams that there was a warranty that the goods were
seaworthy, but that is not so. This very case is provided for in
the Code de Commerce, and unseaworthiness is said not to be
within the perils insured against ; but it is not said that freedom
from such a defect is a condition precedent to the liability of the
underwriter attaching.
KEATING,

J., concurred.
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3unicipal
Bonds.-Where a county issues its bonds payable to bearer,
and pledging the faith, credit, and property of the county, under the
authority of an Act of Assembly, referred to on the face of the bonds
by date, for their payment, and those bonds pass, bona fide, into the
hands of holders for value, the county is bound to pay them. It is no
defence to the claim of such a holder that the Act of Assembly, referred
to on the face of the bonds, authorized the county to issue the bonds
restrictions, limitations, and conditions,"
only and subject to certain "1
which have not been formally complied with; nor that the bonds were
1 From J.. W. Wallace, Esq., Reporter; to appear in Vol; I. of his Reports.
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sold at less than par, when the act authorizing their issue, and referred
to by date on the face of the instrument, declared that they should, "in
no case," nor "under any pietence," be so sold: Mercer County vs.
Hacket; Gelpcke vs. City of Dubuque; .Afeyer vs. City of luscatine ; Van
.Botrup vs. Madison City.
Municipal Corporation.-An authority to a city corporation to take
stock in any chartered company for making "a road or roads to said
city," authorizes taking stock in a road between other cities or towns,
from the nearest of which to the city subscribing there is a direct road;
the road in which the stock is taken being in fact a road in extension
and prolongation of one leading into the city: Van Hostrupvs. Madison
City.
legotiable Instruments.-Corporation bonds payable to bearer, though
under seal, have, in this day, the qualities of negotiable instruments.
And a party recovering on the coupons will be entitled to the amount
of them, with interest and exchange at the place where, by their terms,
they were made payable: Mercer County vs. .acket; Gedpcke vs. City.
of Dubuque; Meyer vs.City of Muscatine.
The indorsement of negotiable paper with the words "for collection,"
restrains its negotiability; and a party who has thus indorsed it, is competent to prove that he was not the owner of it, and did not mean to
give title to it or to its proceeds when collected: Sweeny vs. Easter.
Where a banker, having mutual dealings with another banker, is in
the habit of transmitting to him in the usual course of business negotiable paper for collection, the collection being in fact sometimes on
account of the transmitting banker himself, and sometimes on account
of his customers, and fails, owing his corresponding banker a balance
in general account,i. Such corresponding banker cannot retain to answer that balance any
paper so transmitted for collection, and really belonging to third persons,
if he knew it was sent for collection merely; and as respects the knowledge of or notice to the receiving banker, it is unimportant from what
source he may have derived it.
Ii. Neither can he retain it, if he did not know that it was so sent, unless he have given credit to the transmitting banker, or have suffered a
balance t6 remain in his'hands, to be met by the paper transmitted or
expected to be transmitted in the usual course of dealings between
them.
. in. But if the receiving banker have treated the transmitting banker
as owner of the transmitted paper, and had no notice to the contrary,
and, upon the credit of such remittances made or anticipated in the
usual course of dealing between them, balances were from time to time
4uffered to remain in the 'hands of the transmitting and now failed
banker, to be met by proceeds of such negotiable paper transmitted, then
the receiving banker is entitled to retain the paper or its proceeds
against the banker sending it, for the balance of account due him, the
receiving banker aforesaid: l.
Patent.-Patentsfor inventions are nqt to be treated as mere monopolies, and therefore as odious in the law, bout are to receive a liberal construction, ana uider a fair applitation of the" rule that they be construed
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ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Hence, where the "claim" immediately follows the description, it may be construed in connection with the
explanations contained in the specification; and be restricted accordingly: Turrill vs, Railroad Co.
Where a patent is for a combination of distinct and designated parts,
it is not infringed by a combination which varies from that patented, in
the omission of one of the operative parts and the substitution therefor
of another part substantially different in its construction and operation,
but serving the same purpose: Zames vs. Godfrey.
In cases where an invention for which a patent is sought comes within
the category of a machine, the patent must be for it, and not for its
"mode of operation," nor for its "principle," nor for its "idea," noir
for any "abstraction" whatsoever: Bu~r vs. Duryee.
TWarrant.-In an action for a false warranty, whether the action be
in assumpsit or in tort, a scienter need not be averred; and if averred,
need not be proved: Sehuchardi vs. Aliens.
SUsury.-Where the rate of interest is fixed by law at so much per
annum, a contract may lawfully be made for the payment of that rate
before the principal comes due, at periods shorter than a year; even
although the effect of this may be, by allowing the party to reinvest and
so compound his interest, to get more than the rate fixed: Meyer vs. City
of Muscatine.
A person contracting for the payment of interest may contract to pay
it either at the rate of the "1place of contract," or at that of the "place
of performance," as one or the other may be agreed on by himself and
the creditor; and the fact that the rate of the place at which it is agreed
that it shall be paid is higher than the rate in the other place, will not
expose the transaction to the imputation of usury, unless the place
agreed on was fixed for the purpose of obtaining the higher rate, and to
evade the penalty of a usurious contract at the other place: Miller vs.
Tiffany.
' Where the promise to pay a sum above legal interest depends upon a
contingency, and not upon any happening of a certain event, the loan is
not usurious. Nor will usurious interest be inferred from a paper which,
while referring to payment of a sum above the legal interest, is "uncertain and so curious," that intentional bad device cannot be affirmed:
Spain vs. Hamilton's Administrator.
SUPREME COURT

OF MASSACHUSETTS.

1

Mortgage of Personal Property for future Indebtedness-lntervening.
Judgment.-A mortgage of personal property, given to secure such sums
as may thereafter become due to the mortgagee, is not a valid security,
as against a judgment-creditor of the mortgagor, for claims accruing
after the property was attached in his suit, and the mortgagee summoned
as trustee: Barnardvs. Moore.
Bequest of Sum, less Debts dice to Testator-Votes of Legatee-Mar1From Charles Allen, Esq., Reporter; to appear in Vol. YI. of his Report.
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tied oman.-If a testator by his will, executed in his last sickness,
creates a fund, and directs the trustees thereof to pay over to each of
his children a certain sum, but provides, that "any legal debt due from
either of said children to my estate at the time of my decease, shall first
be deducted by said trustees, and the balance only be paid over to such
child as aforesaid ;" a married daughter is entitled to receive the whole
sum so directed to be paid, without deduction, although she had signed
notes with her husband to her father for moneys furnished to her husband
by her father, which the latter held at the time of the execution of the
will, and of his death, and upon which he had collected interest in his
lifetime, and which he included in a memorandum of his assets, and
although for sums advanced by him to her, and to others of his children,
he had taken no notes and made no charge, and no debts were due to
him from any of his children, unless these notes and a similar one
executed by another married daughter and her husband, are to be regarded
as such: Rogers vs. Daniell.
NMuisance-Prohzibition of Offensive Trade by Selecten-Notice.Under Gen. Sts. c. 26, § 52, the selectmen of a town, acting as a board
of health, may by a general order forbid the exercise of an offensive
trade or employment therein, without first giving notice to those who at
the time are engaged in carrying on the same: Belcher vs. Farrar.
Private Way-Right of Public to travel over.-If a private way is
opened, leading from a public street, and prepared for use in the same
manner as a public street, and with nothing to show that it is not such,
the public may lawfully travel over it, and in so doing they are bound
only to the same degree of care, in respect to others who are also lawfully using it., as in travelling over public streets: Danforth vs. Durell.
Street Railway Conp)any-Arot taxable for Borses, &c., used by it.An incorporate street railroad company is not taxable for horses or other
personal property used in and necessary for the prosecution of its business: Middlesex Railroad Company vs. Charlestown.
Railroad-AccidentalINww-Mutual Negligence.-Crossing a railroad track without looking to see if a train is coming is not conclusive
proof of a want of care; and if it appears that there is a double track,
and a person has just bought a ticket at a station for a train, which is
to pass upon the further track, and the station agent says to him : "The
train is coming; we will cross over;" and he attempts to follow the
agent, upon the premises of the railroad company, to take his place in
the train, which meanwhile has arrived, and, in crossing over the nearer
track for that purpose, is struck by a train coming from the other direction, and partially behind him, which he did not look for or see until too
late to save himself, it is proper to submit it as a question of fact for the
jury to determine whether he was careless. And while so going from
the ticket office to take his seat in the cars, he is to be considered as a
passenger, and is entitled to the rights of a passenger; and it is the
duty of the railroad company to use the utmost care and diligence in
providing for him a safe and convenient way and manner of access to
the train, and in preventing the interposition of any obstacle which
would unreasonably impede him or expose him to harm while proceeding
to take his seat in the cars, in order to prevent those injuries which
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human care
Co. and foresight can guard against
Railroad

Warren vs. Fitchburg

Decree in Equityt by Supreme Court U. S.-ubseguent Suitfor same
Matter.-A final decree of the Supreme Court of the United States, dismissing a bill in equity after a hearing, is a bar to a subsequent suit in
equity in this court for the, same cause, between the same parties,
although the record shows that such decree was passed by a divided
court: Durant vs. Essex Co.
Writ of Entry-Judgment-Wantof Means to ascertain the Lands
described in the Yerdict.-After a verdict for the demandant in a writ
of entry, for a described portion of the demanded premises, and judgment thereon, a writ of error to reverse the judgment will not be sustaincd on the ground that there are no .sufficient monuments or other
means to enable the parties accurately to ascertain the land described in
the verdict: Silloway vs. Hale.
Way-Right appurtenant to Land granted though Access otherwise
is not impossible.-A way over other land of the grantor in a deed may
pass as appurtenant to the land granted, although there are no insuperable physical obstacles to prevent access by another way, "if such other
way cannot be made without unreasonable labor and expense; and, in
determining this question, a jury may consider the comparative value
of .the land and the probable cost of such a way: Pettingillvs. Porter
and others.
Trespass- Concealment from Owner-Statute of Limitations.-The
omission to disclose a trespass upon real estate to the owner, if there is
no fiduciary relation between the parties, and the owner has the means
of discovering the facts and nothing has been done to prevent him from
discovering them, is not such a fraudulent concealment of the cause of
action as will prevent the operation of the statute, of limitations, under
Gen. Sts. c. 155, § 12: Nidd vs. Ramblin.
Promissory Note-Notice of Non-payment- Waiver of Notice- Collateral Securit.y.-Indorsers of a promissory note do not waive notice of
its non-payment by taking from the maker a mortgage of all his -property, with a general condition to save them harmless from all contracts
entered into by them from him, and by selling the property under a
power of sale contained in the mortgage, for breach of condition : Haskell vs. Boardman anq another.
.ortage-Rights of Mortgagee who has been fraudulently induced
to give up the Possession of the ZMortgage.-If a mortgage of real estate
has not been discharged, but the mortgagor has obtained possession of
the same with the note which it was given to secure by fraudulently.
inducing the mortgagee to accept in payment of the note other securities which are worthless, the latter may maintain an action to foreclose
the mortgage against one who has purchased a title to the premises of
the mortgagor in ignorance of the transaction between him and the
mortgagee; althougg such purchaser has paid money to discharge a new
mortgage upon the premises executed by the mortgagor to one who took
the same relying in good faith upon the fraudulent payment to the original mortgagee: Grimes vs. Kimball.
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Mortgage of PersonalProperty-Adjournmentof Bale.-In the execution of a power of sale in a mortgage of personal property, the mortgagee has a right, in the exercise of a reasonable discretion, to adjourn
the sale from time to time, without doing so through the agency of a
licensed auctioneer or giving any new notice to the mortgagor: llosmer
vs. Sargent.
Mortgage-Suitto foreclose-Reduction of Judgment by Penaltyfor
Usury.-In a suit to foreclose a mortgage, the mortgagor is entitled to
the benefit of the statute penalty for usury in reduction of the sum for
-which conditional judgment is entered. No deduction, however, is to
be made for usury paid under a verbal agreement, which is not incorporated into the written contract: Minot vs. Sawyer.
Negligence-Defective Way-Evidence as to Characterof Plainlnif's
Hforse.-If, in an action to recover for an injury sustained by reason of
a defective way, it becomes a material question whether the plaintiff's
horse had a habit of shying at the time of the accident, the defendants,
after introducing evidence of instances of his shying before that timer
may also prove similar instances afterwards: Todd vs. Inhabitants of
Rowley.
Negligence--Aetion against Municipal Corporation for Failure to
keep Sewer in Repair.-No action lies against a city for a failure to
keep a public sewer and cesspool in repair, whereby waste water accumulates and flows into the cellar of a neighboring house, which is not
connected by a drain with the public sewer: Bar)y vs. Lowell.
Municipal Corporation-Liabilityfor Money borrowed by Treasurer
and Converted to his own Use.-If the inhabitants of a town have
authorized their treasurer to borrow a certain sum of money for a specific
purpose, and to give his note as treasurer therefor, and he has exercised
this authority, they are not liable upon a note given by him in their
name for money subsequetitly borrowed by him and converted to his own
use, although he assumed to be acting under the authority conferred
upon him, and the lender supposed that he was doing so: Lowell Savings Bank vs. Winchester.
Execution-Attachment on Goods of Separate Owners which have
been. Mingled.-If two separate owners mingle their goods together, it
is the duty of an officer who wishes to make an attachment upon a writ
against one of them to ascertain, if he can, what portion of the goods
belongs to each; and not to attach the whole of thlem without making
the inquiry: Carlton vs. Davis.
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI.

1

landlordsand Tenants-Covenantfor Rfnewal.-A covenant by the
landlord to renew the lease for a second term, does not give the tenant
a right at law to retain possession of the premises demised after the ex1 From Charles C. Whittesey, Esq., Reporter; to appear in Vol. 34th of Missouri Reports.
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piration of the original term. If the landlord refuse to comply with
this covenant, the tenant has a remedy in equity, or in an action upon
the covenants: Finney vs. Cist.
Agency-Power-Partnershlip-Assignmet.-A power of attorney
from one partner to his copartner, giving him authority to manage his
individual business, and also to superintend the partnership business, to
make such purchases as is usual to keep up the stock, and to renew
notes in bank, will not authorize such copartner to make a general
assignment of the partnership i.property for the benefit of creditors:
Hook vs. Stone.
Eguity-Life Estate-Remainderman.-Whenthe owner of the life
estate in personal property so deals with it as to endanger the estate of
those in remainder, a court of equity will require the owner of such life
estate to give security against loss to those in remainder: Leweey vsJ ewey.
Abstract of Title- Contract-Damages.-Whereoneparty undertakes
for a valuable consideration to furnish another with an abstract of title,
or statement of the conveyances and encuinbrances affecting a tract of
land, and incorrectly reports the quantity of land previously conveyed,
he will be liable to respond in damages to the party who, relying upon
such information, purchases the land: Clark vs. .arshall et al.
Attachment-Garnishee.--FraudulentConveance.-A' deed of trust
made by a debtor conveying a stock in trade to secure notes not due,
and reserving to the grantors the right to remain in possession, with the
right of using and selling the property until the happening of some one
of the contingencies, without accountability to any one for the proceeds
of sales made in the meantime, is a conveyance for the use of the
grantor, and is fraudulent and void as against attaching creditors; and
although the trustee may have taken possession of the goods, he will be
held liable as garnishee to the attaching creditor for the property in his
hands. (BATES, C. J., dissenting.) Armstrong vs. Tuttle.
Accord-Evidence.-Where two partners have, under the advice of a
friend, come to a settlement of their partnership accounts, evidence that
the friend was mistaken as to some of the facts is immaterial, it not appearing that the partners themselves were mistaken as to any fact at the
time of the settlement: Thompson vs. Bennett's Adm'r.
Crime-Insanity-Burden of Proof-It is a presumption of law.
that the party indicted for a crime is sane, and the burden of proof is
upon the defendant to show that he was insane at the time of the commission of the crime charged: State of Missourivs. Mf Coy.
State- County- City of St. Louis-Constitution-Revenue.-The
money acquired by a county from the taxation of its citizens is not the
private property' of the county, and an act of the General Assembly directing the county to appropriate part of its funds to pay a portion of
the police expenses of a city situated within its limits, is not an applica.
tion of property to private uses, and is not the- taking of private pro.
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perty to public uses without compensation, the police commissioners
being an agency of the State government and performing public duties:
State vs. County Court of St. Louis County.
State- County--Consttution.-1. An act directing the county to appropriate part of its revenue, already collected, in a particular way, is
not unconstitutional, as being retrospective in its operation. It takes
away no vested right, nor does it impair the obligation of contracts. The
acts of the Legislature, providing the objects for which county funds
could be appropriated, are at times subject to repeal or alteration, so as
to appropriate the funds in a manner, or to objects, different from those
before provided. 2. Such act does not violate the principles of taxation
laid down in the constitution. (.Hamilton and Treat vs. St. Louis County,
15 Mo. 3, affirmed.) 3. A county is not a private corporation, but an
agency of the State government; and while the Legislature cannot take
from the county its property, it has fdll power to- direct the mode in
which property shall be used for the benefit of the county: Id.
Conveyance-Descrption-Execution-Slheriff'sDeed.-The sheriff
sold and conveyed under execution a tract of land, describing it as a
tract of land situate about six miles northwestwardly from the city of St.
Louis, on the River des Peres, containing fifteen hundred arpens, more
or less, being part of a tract of eighteen hundred arpens granted to
James McDonald, February 6, 1798, &c,, and adjoining land granted to
Mary L. Papin. Held, that the deed was void for uncertainty of description, but had the land been conveyed by the defendant in the execution, by the same description, the deed might have passed either all
the interest of the grantor in the tract, or fifteen hundred parts in
eighteen hundred. Reld. further, that the evidence did not give certainty to the description in the sheriff's deed: Clemens vs. Rannels.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.1
Husband and J'fe- Wife's Earnings.-An agreement-made previous
to 1860, between a married woman, with the knowledge and consent of
her husband, and a third person, for personal services to be rendered by
her to the latter, who agrees that she shall be paid what her services are
reasonably worth, gives to the wife no title to her earnings in her own
right. In law they belong absolutely to the husband, and the promise
to pay her is, in law, a promise to pay the husband: Woodbeck vs.
Bewens."
The common law still controls the relation and rights of husband and
wife, except where those rights have been modified or changed by statute : Id.
There was no statute in New York giving a married woman the right
to perform labor or services on her sole and separate account, until that
of March 20, 1860. And that statute does not operate to divest a husband of his right to the wife's earnings for services previously ren.
dered: Id.
1 From the Hon. 0. L. Barbour; to appear in Vol. 42d of his Reports.
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A wife cannot maintain an action to recover pay for her services, ai
trustee of an express trust,; there being, in respect to such claim, no
such relation between husband and wife as trustee and cestui que trust:

Id.
Sale of Chattes-- What is a sufficient Delivery.-M. being indebted
to D., turned out to him a quantity of marble, not then in the actual
custody of MiLbut in the custody of third persons, with the und6rstinding that D. should sell it and apply the avails on M.'s debt. 31. delivered to D. a schedule of the pieces of marble, and D. arranged with
the persons having the property in charge to keep and take care of i
for him. Beld, that this was an absolute and unconditional sale; and
that, under the circumstances, there was a suffejent delivery to take the
ease out of the statute: Dixon vs. Buck Sheriff &c.
Statute of Limitations-ina Surrogate's Court.-The Statute of Limitations may be interposed in a Surrogate's Court as well as in any othen
And in a case where courts of law have a concurrent jurisdiction with
the surrogate and a court of equity, the six years' limitation will constitute a bar to the proceedings in the Surrogate's Court: Smith, E'r:'
I
vs. Remington.
& v.,
Where a legacy was due and payable, by the terms of the will, wheA
the legatee became 21, 'Which -w6in November, 1854, and the proceedings' before the surrogate to colnkel an account, and payment of thlt acy by that executor, were not instituted until the 4th of June, 1860,
ibbtt one year and six months after the six years from the time tUi
gacy fell due had expired. Beld, that the Statute of Limitations WO

a bar: Id.

Right of a Town to Sue.-A town ha Do right' to money improperly
collected by tax from its tax-payers, and cannot maintain an action in
the name of its supervisor to recover it back: Gailervs. Herricek.
What Creditorsmay set aside anAssignment-Receivers, Suits W_
Assignments for benefit of Creditors-Assignees,Allowances to.A sa
ple contract-creditor cannot maintain an action to set aside an assignment
made for the benefit of creditrs: Coope, Receiver, vs. Bowles et al.
A receiver must state in his complaint the equity of the parties whose
rlghts, under the order of the court appointing him, lhe represents, to
maintain the action which he attempts to prosecute: Id.
A receiver in general is not clothed with any right to mainfain an action which the parties or the estate which lie represents could not maintain. He must show a cause of action existing in those parties, an
that by the appointment of the court, lawfully made in a matter where
the court had jurisdiction, the power has been conferred on him in.his
as receiver to prosecute the'action : V.
representative
. To authorizecapacity
a receiver appointed in supplementary prpcepding tQ
prosecute an action to set aside an assignment made by the debtpr, the
judgment and other facts necessary to maintain the proceedings must Ie
set forth. It is not enough to allege in the complaint that the pl'aintig
was appointed receiver in supplementary proceedings: Id.
An assignment in trust for creditors, executed here by two of the four
members of a firm, the other two members being absent from the coun-
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try, cannot be supported unless due authority for its execution on their
behalf by the absent members or a subsequent ratification of such execution is proven: Id.
Whatever moneys of the estate were paid for expenses or to creditors,
under an assignment in good faith, before the commencement of an action to set it aside, should be allowed to the assignee, if the assignment
is finally held invalid. But payments to himself or to his own firm, do
not come within this principle: Id.
Transfers with intent to Defraud Creditors- Vendee's knowledge qf
Vendor's fraud-Partnership;transfer of Property by, to Pay indilidual Dcbts-Judge's charge.-A transfer of goods by one who is
indebted or insolvent, or whether indebted or insolvent or not, with the
design and intent to defraud some creditor of his and deprive him of
the ability to collect his debt, may be made under such circumstances
that if the goods be followed the law will regard it as an actual fraud
between him and his vendee: Walsh vs. Kelly, Sherff.
The vendee's knowledge of facts and circumstances tending to prove
a fraudulent motive on the part of the vendor need not be sought for or*
inferred from obscure or doubtful indications, where there was an express agreement between them. And a request to submit an inquiry to
the jury as to fraud arising out of facts and circumstances only, is, in
such a case: immaterial; and if the judge refuses to submit the question, an exception to his refusal is not well taken. If such a motive
existed, it will implicate the purohaser as well as the vendor: 1d.
There is no ground for charging the purchaser with notice of a
fraudulent intent on the part of the vendor, from facts and circumstances merely, when it is plain that if there was any such intent the
purchaser was act and part in it: id.
A firm composed of three members has no right to apply the partnership property to the payment of the debts of two of its members. If
it is so transferred it is subject to seizure under attachments issued at
Id.
the suit of creditors of the firm:
The knowledge that a firm is in failing circumstances will not, per se,
render it unlawful for a credit~r to receive a transfer of goods from the
failing firm in satisfaction of a demand: Rd.
It is proper for a judge to charge a proposition based on facts which
are questions in the cause for the jury to determine: d.
Husband and Wife-Wife's separate Estate, when charqeable.Where a married woman, having a separate estate, and transacting business on her own account by her husband as her agent, employs attorneys to commence suits upon accounts growing out of the wife's business, the separate estate of the wife is liable for such services rendered
by the attorneys as are found to have been for the benefit of the wife
and her separate estate: Owen et al. vs. CawTeY.
If the suits and proceedings were instituted for the purpose of benefiting the wife's separate estate, the fact that they, or some of them,
were unsuccessful, is not of controlling importance on the question of
the liability of. her separate estate : Id.
Eminent Domain-Power to take the franchises of a Corporation
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for Public use-Railroads.-The state legislature, under the power
of eminent domain, can take the franchises of a corporation for public
use, upon making due compensation: In the matter of the Petition of
Kerr and others.
Railroads constructed and operated under the authority of the state
legislature, by corporations or joint stock companies, are to be deemed
constructed and operated for public use or benefit; and the legislature
may delegate to such corporations or joint stock companies the right or
power of eminent domain: Id.
The same rules apply where the right is given to individuals and their
assigns: id.
Parties- Trustee-Indorsement of a" Corporatdon-Rightof Corporation to Pledge its Assets.-Where a mutual insurance company being in
need of funds to pay losses, procured a loan from different persons and
firms, and transferred to the plaintiff premium notes made by various
individuals, to be held by him as collateral security for the repayment
of the loan; Held, that the plaintiff held the notes as trustee of an express trust, and that an action on two of them was prbperly brought in
his name: Clark vs. Titcomb.
It being the usual custom of a corporation to transfer its notes by the
mere indorsement of the president, such an indorsement is all that is
requisite to effect a transfer of the title, when the transfer itself is
authorized by a resolution of the directors: Id.
A corporation having the power to borrow money for its ordinary
business and to accomplish its~objects, and to issue its own obligations
for money so borrowed, has also the right, instead of giving its own
obligations, to turn out its assets to secure the payment of the loan. The
two powers stand on the same principles: 1d.
.MIarineInsurance- Valued Policy.-The defendant insured the flaintiff in the sum of $6000 on one-fifth of the freight of a ship lost or not
lost, for one year from September 10, 1859, the whole freight valued at
$30,000, for a premium of 7J per cent. According to th6 last-'advices
received by the plaintiff prior to the insurance, the ship was on the 10th
of September, 1859, at San Francisco, ready for sea, and about to sail
for Hong Kong, having a small amount of freight and a considerable
number of passengers. These facts were communicated to the insurers
previous to the insurance. The vessel sailed on the 10th of September
with freight only to the amount of $1,176.75, and with passengers.
When five days out she was totally destroyed by fire. The premium
usually charged in 1859, on a single voyage from San Francisco to.
Hong Kong, in a ship of a similar kind and size, was from one and a
half to two per cent. .Held, that the defendants were concluded by the
valuation stated in the policy and that the platntiff was entitled to'
recover one-fifth of that sum, viz., $6000: Delano vs. The American
ins. Go. of Boston.
ifel, also, that the assured need not prove the value of the freight;
the valuation being a mere substitute, as between the parties, for the
computation of the value in an open policy; provided it was neither
intended as a cover for a wager, by both parties, nor fraudulently made
by the insured.
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Held, further, that the case was the same as though the subject of
insurance was actually proved to have been worth the sum at which it
was valued: Id.
And that the defendants could not claim an allowance in the nature
of salvage for the prepaid passage money: Id.
Innkeepers-NTeir Liability as Insurers.-The liability of an innkeeper is of the same stringent character as is that of a common carrier;
that is to say, both are deemed to be insurers of the property delivered
to them, with a consequent liability for loss and damage happening to it
while in their possession : except when such loss or damage is occasioned.
by the act of God, or the public enemy, or through the fault of the
owner: Bulett vs. ,wwfft, Executor.
Accordingly held, that an innkeeper was liable for property of a guest,
destroyed byfire, while in the barn attached to the inn: Rd.
Contributon-Subrogation.-Theplaintiff and defendant and four
other persons.were the only stockholders and the trustees of a manufacturing corporation. The corporation being indebted to C. for money
borrowed, he required, as a condition of a continuance of the loan, the
individual note of all or some of the stockholders. Thereupon five of
the stockholders and trustees, including the plaintiff and defendant, executed their joint and several promissory note to him for the amount of
his claim. G., one of the stockholders who did not sign the note, and
the corporation, became insolvent, and the plaintiff paid the note and
took it up. Held, 1. That as between the makers of the note and the
payee, the former were jointly and severally liable to pay the whole
amount. That as between them and the corporation, they were all accommodation makers; and the corporation was liable to each of them
for all sums which they should have to pay. And that, as between
themselves, each was liable to pay one-fifth part of the whole amount.
2. That these rules were not to be changed or misapplied either because
the makers of the note had unequal interests in the corporation, or because the company, or G. became insolvent. 8. That there was, strictly
speaking, no subrogation of the plaintiff to all the rights of the payee;
but his payment of the note authorized him to sue any of the other
makers for contribution. And that the defendant was liable to pay his
one-fifth part of the amount so paid by the plaintiff; which was recoverable in an action at law: Coburn vs. Wheelock.
Formersuit, when a bar.-A suit brought for one portion of a demand, or for one of several demands arising out of the same contract
or transaction, is a bar to a subsequent suit for the residue of such demand or demands, if they were all due when the suit was commenced;
and this though only a portion of the demands were litigated in the
former suit, or a part were withdrawn: lopf et al. vs. Ajers.
So, if a plaintiff having a claim arriving out of the contract or transaction sued on, which accrued prior to the commencement of the suit,
omits to make such claim, and the same is not in issue in the suit, and
no evidence is given in support of it, he will be barred from presenting
such claim as a set off, in a subsequent action brought against him upon
the judgment recovered in the prior suit: Id.

